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INTRODUCTION 
Traffic conflicts are measures of accident potential 
and operational problems at a highway location. A 
conflict occurs when a driver violates a rule of the road 
or makes an agressive movement. Conflict studies may 
be treated in terms of objective criteria. Significant data 
may be obtained in as little as one day of observation. 
Operational problems found in this way may be resolved 
before accidents occur. 
Conflicts may also be used to quickly evaluate 
some changes in road design, signing, signalization, and 
environment. After a location is identified as hazardous, 
a study of conflict patterns together with accident 
diagrams give a better understanding of operational 
deficiencies and accident causation. 
Many highway agencies are now using observations 
of traffic conflicts to complement accident data. 
Accident records in many cases are incomplete and 
inaccurate, and several years of data are needed for a 
reliable sample. Also, accident diagrams do not always 
give the whole picture of operational problems at a site; 
and, therefore, the most ·appropriate highway 
improvement may be overlooked. 
Formalized conflict techniques give an objective 
measure of traffic problems and a permanent record of 
their comparative magnitudes. The use of traffic conflict 
techniques has, to date, been primarily limited to 
intersections. However, conflict-type analyses for other 
locations are under development. 
The most serious type of conflict is an erratic 
maneuver, which is any sudden, unexpected movement 
that may result in an accident. Erratic maneuvers have 
been used in the evaluation of gore areas and in locating 
accident-prone locations. 
A near-miss accident occurs when a collision 
between two or more vehicles is avoided due to a 
last-second evasive movement or stop. A very severe 
conflict or erratic maneuver is considered to be a 
near-miss accident. Near-miss accidents occur 
infrequently in comparison to other conflicts. Great 
reliance on the subjectivity of observers is essential in 
classifying near-miss accidents. 
The ordering of traffic descriptors at a site in terms 
of intensity is as follows: 
I. traffic volume, 
2. minor conflicts, 
3. moderate conflicts and erratic maneuvers, 
4. severe conflicts or near-misses, 
5. minor collisions (usually not reported), 
6. property damage accidents, 
7. injury accidents, and 
8. fatal accidents. 
Accident data provide the last three levels; conflict 
counts provide four; volume collllts are usually made 
along with most conflict counts. Conflicts, erratic 
maneuvers, and near-miss accidents provide an important 
base of information for use in traffic engineering 
decisions. 
Techniques for counting conflicts, erratic 
maneuvers, and near-miss accidents are described herein. 
Applications of conflict counts by other agencies are 
summarized. Other information in this report will be 
useful in developing a routine, systematic procedure for 
collection and analysis of conflict data in Kentucky. 
THE NEED FOR ANALYSES OF 
TRAFFIC CONFLICTS 
Several limitations have been observed in the use 
of accident data in traffic safety studies. Accident files 
contain records of reported accidents only, which are 
only a fraction of the accidents that actually occur. 
Also, the criteria for reporting vary considerably 
between states. For example, all traffic accidents in 
Colorado, Nevada, and the District of Columbia. must 
be reported, while only accidents involving injury costs 
exceeding $400 to any one person must be reported 
in Connecticut. The most common limits for reporting 
are $100 (23 states) and $200 (12 states) in damages 
(1). The number of accidents reported at a site is, 
therefore, a function of local reporting laws, accident 
severity, and damage costs. 
Another problem with using accident data alone 
for identifying and evaluating high-accident sites is the 
spurious fluctuations in occurrences. Many accidents 
result from a vehicle malfunction (blowout or brake 
failure), obvious driver error (speeding or drunk driving), 
or a weather-related problem (ice on road or heavy fog), 
which are not related to any geometric deficiency. A 
study completed in 1973 illustrated the effect of 
random (spurious) occurrences on the identification of 
hazardous sites in Kentucky. Of the 208 spot locations 
identified from accident data as being hazardous, 99 of 
them were identified falsely because of random 
occurrences. The 99 sites were found by field 
inspections to need no improvements, and accidents 
decreased to normally low levels the following year. 
Nearly half of the locations identified by accidents did 
not warrant any improvements in the roadway (2). 
The use of number of accidents for predicting 
future accidents at a location (accident repeatability) has 
also been found to be somewhat unreliable. An analysis 
of 60 intersections in Central Kentucky showed that the 
correlation coefficient (r) was only 0.64 when 
correlating the number of accidents for a given year with 
the successive year. The 95-percent confidence band 
(twice the standard error) for this relationship was ± 
10.9 accidents per year for an average of 11.1 accidents 
per year. This indicated that an error of almost 100 
percent in either direction is possible when comparing 
accident numbers from one year to the next. A similar 
analysis was also made for 170 rural, 0.3-mile ( 480-m) 
spots in Kentucky; and a r-value of only 0.59 was found. 
More than a !DO-percent error was also found for this 
sample of locations (95-percent confidence), illustrating 
the non-repeatability of accident data (3). Similar 
fmdings were noted in the state of Washington where 
the year-to-year reliability of accident data ranged from 
r-values of 0.60 to 0.65 (4). 
Another problem with accident data is the time 
needed to obtain a significant data base. In connection 
with a previous study in Kentucky, it was suggested that 
between I and 2 years of accident data were necessary 
to insure reliability when selecting high-accident 
locations (5). Another study of 433 intersections over 
a 13-year period indicated that 3 years of data should 
be used (6). Years of waiting are often necessary to 
determine the effectiveness of highway improvements if 
accident data alone is used. Also, several accidents must 
occur before improvements normally can be justified. 
The information contained on individual accident 
reports may also be incomplete or biased. The 
investigating police officer has primary responsibility of 
aiding injured persons, maintaining traffic, and 
determining fault of the accident (for insurance 
purposes). He may not be aware of specific contributing 
causes of the accident. While accident data alone has 
many limitations, it can be quite useful when 
complemented by traffic conflict data. Accident 
histories may indicate locations where conflict data 
might indicate appropriate improvements and later to 
determine whether or not the improvements were 
effective. 
THE GENERAL MOTORS TECHNIQUE 
In 1967, the first formalized, systematic procedure 
for identifying and recording traffic conflicts at 
intersections was published. The technique was 
developed by Perkins and Harris of· General Motors 
Corporation and is commonly referred to as the GM 
technique. It has gained widespread acceptance and, 
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with minor modifications, is the basis used by several 
highway agencies (7)'. In 1969, a procedures manual was 
written by Perkins to give additional information for 
collection of conflict data (8). 
The GM technique identifies five major classes of 
traffic conflicts: left-turn, weave, cross-traffic, red-light 
violation, and rear-end. There are 24 specific conflict 
categories which are classified under the basic conflict 
groups. Defmitions (7) of these basic groups are as 
follows: 
Left-turn Conflict occurs when a vehicle turns left 
in front of an oncoming, through vehicle, and causes 
the through vehicle to brake or swerve. This conflict 
would be observed on the approach of the through 
vehicle from a brakelight or a lane change. 
Weave Conflict is a situation where a vehicle 
changes lanes into the path of another vehicle causing 
the offended driver to brake or swerve to avoid a 
collision. This conflict is viewed from the rear where 
brakelight applications can be observed. Weave conflicts 
can result from lane changes, improper turns from lanes, 
or turns into wrong lanes. 
Cross-traffic Conflict results when a vehicle crosses 
or turns into the path of a through vehicle having right 
of way, causing it to brake or swerve. Crp��s-traffic 
conflicts usually occur at non-signalized iniei"sections 
where the minor approach is controlled by stop signs. 
Cross-traffic conflicts may be through-, left-turn-, or 
right-turn-type movements by the offending vehicle. The 
right-turn, cross-traffic conflict may occur at a sign'ali�ed 
intersection where a vehicle turns right on red in front 
of an oncoming vehicle. 
Red-light Violation occurs when a vehicle crosses 
the stop line (bar) on a red phase. Vehicles which enter 
the intersection on green and complete their movement 
on red are not cOllsidered violators. The three categories 
of red-light violations are left-turn, right-turn, and 
through vehicles. 
Rear-end Conflict is a situation in which a vehicle 
stops or slows unexpectedly and causes a following 
vehicle to take evasive action to avoid a rear-end 
collision. Twelve specific rear-end conflicts are 
I. stop on amber, 
2. slow for left turn, 
3. slow for right tum, 
4. previous traffic conflict, 
5. shopping entrance beyond intersection, 
6. slow truck, 
7. congestion in intersection, 
8. clear intersection, 
9. stalled vehicle, 
10. traffic back-up, 
II. pedestrian, and 
12. merging beyond intersection. 
All rear-end conflicts are observed on tbe approach 
where brakelight applications can be observed (8). 
In addition to the five major categories of conflicts, 
pedestrian-vehicle conflicts are also counted and 
classified as single vehicle-pedestrian or weave-pedestrian 
conflicts. When counting conflicts, each event is 
considered only one conflict. For example, if a vehicle 
stops suddenly and causes five following vehicles to 
apply brakelights, only one rear-end conflict is counted. 
Diagrams of specific types of conflicts are shown in 
Figure 1 (7). 
The data sheet used in the GM technique is shown 
in the APPENDIX (Figure A!). The starting thne of the 
count (military thne) is entered in tbe columns at the 
far left. There are 24 categories. The first 10 groups 
are considered maneuver conflicts; the next 12 are 
rear-end conflicts; and the last two involve pedestrians. 
The maneuver conflicts include counts of tbe number 
of vehicles making the movement and tbe number of 
conflicts resulting. Categories S through 10 are usually 
associated with non-signalized intersections (8). 
The GM survey is usually a one-day surveillance 
of the two major approaches of an intersection. This 
corresponds to approximately 2.S hours of data for each 
leg. If data collection is required for all four approach 
legs, two days of data collection are recommended. The 
survey team consists of two observers on one approach 
leg at the same thne. Usually, one observer counts and 
records conflict data and the otber observer records 
volume data (Figure A2) (8). Recornlhended days are 
Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday. The survey day is 
a 10-hour period from 7:30 a.m. to 12:00 noon and 
12:4S p.m. to 6: IS p.m. Survey thnes are somethnes 
extended to include both morning and afternoon peaks. 
After each IS-minute period of counting, the next 
IS-minute period is used for recording data and for 
moving to the next approach leg. For most T- and 
four-way intersections, data are collected only on tbe 
two major approach legs. Where two major arterials 
cross, data should be taken alternately on all approach 
legs. 
Data should be collected from a vehicle parked on 
tbe roadway shoulder about 100 to 300 feet (30 to 90 
m) back from tbe intersection. The vehicle should face 
the direction of travel and not interfere witb normal 
movements of traffic. In urban areas where sidewalks 
are adjacent to the road, observers should stand or sit 
at appropriate distances from the intersection. Police 
vehicles should not be used for data collection. 
Other information needed is given in the 
APPENDIX. It includes an inventory of existing highway 
features (Figure A3), an inventory of past safety 
improvements (Figure A4), accident data (Figure AS), 
and photographs of the intersection (Figure A6). Data 
formats on all sheets were designed for punching on 
computer card. Details of coding instructions can be 
found in the GM procedures manual (8). 
METHODS USED BY OTHER AGENCIES 
While the GM technique is the basis for conflict 
counts by several highway agencies, many modifications 
have been made to fit local needs and preferences. 
Various severity categories of conflicts are used in Great 
Britain and in the state of Washington. In Washington, 
conflicts are classified as a routine conflict, a moderate 
hazard, or a near miss (4). Five levels of severity were 
used by Spicer in Great Britain to rate conflicts as 
follows (9, 10, 11): 
I. precautionary braking or lane change where 
a collision is very unlikely, 
2. controlled braking or lane change to avoid 
collision but with ample maneuver time, 
3. rapid deceleration, lane change, or stopping to 
avoid collision (a near-miss situation), 
4. emergency braking or violent swerve to avoid 
collision resulting in a very near miss or minor 
collision, and 
S. emergency action followed by a collision. 
The first two groups were termed slight, and the last 
three were termed serious. For some uses, only the 
serious conflicts were considered, 
Washington collects data on any day of the week, 
including Saturdays and Sundays, if the problem at a 
particular site is most acute at !bat thne. Conflict counts 
are made during the most critical thne periods at a given 
intersection, and the necessary information is collected 
within a 4- to 6-hour period. Washington uses one 
observer in a vehicle to count conflicts and another 
observer in a second vehicle to count traffic volumes 
(4, 12). 
In Ohio (13), only one trained observer collects 
all tbe data. The observation point is about 330 feet 
(100 m) back from the intersection. At unsignalized 
intersections, counts are made on the two uncontrolled 
approach legs on a given day. At signalized intersections, 
the two opposing legs are observed on one day, and 
a second day is needed for tbe otber two legs. Counts 
are made only on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday 
but not on the day of or the day before a holiday. 
Days of inclement weather are also avoided. About 100 
intersections are counted by each trained observer 
annually. 
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left-turn vehicle crosses directly in 
front of or blocks the lane of an 
opposing thru vehicle. The thru 
vehicle brakes or weaves. 
Vehicle changes lanes into or crosses 
the path of another vehicle. Offended 
vehicle brakes or weaves. 
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Cross-Traffic Conflicts 
Thru-Cross-Tralfic =----=---- ------da-�-­
Left-Turn-Cross-Tramc-=--= Qq =--=-
R;ght-T"m-Ccm-T"mc_1 
1
\
: 
Vehicle crosses or turns into path of 
right-of-way vehicle. Offended vehicle 
brakes or weaves to avoid collision. 
LEFT -TURN- CROSS-TRAFFIC CONFLICT 
Red-light Violations 
Thru-on-Red 
Left-Turn-on-Red 
Right-Turn-on-Red 
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LEFT-TURN-ON-RED 
Vehicle enters intersection. crosses 
curb-line. after signa! has turned red. 
Vehicles that have entered the inter­
section legally and complete their 
movement after the signa! changes 
are not counted as violations. 
Figure L Conflict Criteria from GM Technique (7). 
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STOP-ON-AMBER 
REAR-END CONFL!CT 
Vehicle in a thru lane slows to turn 
left or right. Following thru vehicle 
brakes or weaves. 
Pair of vehicles entering an inter­
section caused to si(MI for condition 
ahead. Occasions are counted, not the 
number of vehicles involved. 
Pair of vehicles enters intersection, first 
vehicle is involved in a conflict and si(Mis. 
Following vehicle brakes to avoid first 
vehicle. 
Pair of.. vehicles approaching intersection 
are faced with "amber-light dilemma." 
First vehicle stops. 
In Canada, because of very low traffic volumes on 
many rural roads, counting times are from 7:00 a.m. 
to 9:00 p.m. and may be completed in two, ?·hour days. 
Data are collected on Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, 
and Thursdays. Three or four observers may be used, 
depending on the type of intersection (T· or four·way 
intersection); and volume and conflict counts are 
recorded at hourly intervals (14). 
The Transport and Road Research Laboratory 
studies in Great Britain are based on an average of a 
IO·hour day (8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.). Direct, on·site 
collection of data requires two to six observers, 
depending on site conditions. A second procedure 
consists of fllming a location with time·lapse, color 
photography (at two frames per second using a 16·mm 
camera). An elevated vantage point is necessary for 
camera placement. Analysis of the film is made by 
trained analysts. An average of about one man·hour of 
analysi,'l is required for each hour of filming. Speed 
measurements of vehicles are also taken using radar 
meters (9, 10, 11 ). 
CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFY ING 
HAZARDOUS SITES 
Washington1s criteria for rating intersections by 
priority is based on numbers of conflicts per hour and 
type of intersection. Conflict counts are taken only at 
intersections with operational deficiencies, so conflict 
counts represent the most hazardous intersections. All 
intersections are classified as (I) signalized and 
channelized, (2) signalized only, (3) channelized only, 
or (4) non-channelized (12). Five priority levels are used 
for rating intersections in each of the four classifications. 
Priority I is the top IS percent of intersections, Priority 
2 is the next IS percent, Priority 3 is the next 20 
percent, and Priorities 4 and S constitute 2S percent 
each. Intersections in Priority 1 require corrective action 
as soon as possible. Locations in Priority 2 should be 
corrected as soon as funds are available, and Priority 
3 intersections are worthy of consideration for future 
improvements. Priority 4 and 5 sites are not seriously 
considered for improvements at present. Their conflict 
criteria are given in Table I for each classification and 
priority group. For example, intersections which are 
signalized only are placed in Priority I if they have 6S 
or more conflicts per hour. Other conflict criteria are 
46 to 64 for Priority 2, 24 !Q 4S for Priority 3, 9 to 
23 for Priority 4, and 8 and under for Priority S. 
Another use of conflict counts for rating 
intersections was in a study in Pennsylvania by Taylor 
and Thompson in 1976 (15). There, nine highway and 
traffic indicators were used to compute a hazard index 
for each intersection. They included number of 
accidents, accident rate, accident severity, 
volume·capacity ratio, sight distance, traffic conflicts, 
erratic maneuvers, driver expectancy, and deficiencies in 
signing, etc. The rating was based on data from 
Washington state and was expressed as a second·degree 
curve (number of conflicts per hour versus indicator 
value) as shown in Figure 2. Based on the conflicts per 
hour at an intersection, the hazard index from 0 to 100 
can be found. 
In a Kentucky study completed in 1976, Agent 
developed warrants for left.turn phasing based on 
left.turn conflicts during peak hours ( 16 ). Correlations 
were made between left-turn conflicts and histories of 
left·turn accidents at 32 intersections. Based on these 
relationships, warrants were developed for consideration 
of left.turn phasing. An average of 10 or more left·turn 
conflicts in the peak hour was the qualifying criterion. 
Warrants were also developed based on left-turn 
accidents. 
Conflict rates (conflicts per 1,000 opportunities) 
incorporates traffic volumes and allow comparison 
between locations having different volumes. Average 
conflict rates could be determined for various categories 
of intersections. As this base of data becomes very large 
and statewide conflict rates are approximated for various 
types of locations, the Rate·Quality Control technique 
could be applied in a manner similar to that applied 
to accidents; this assumes that conflicts approximate a 
Poisson distirbution. 
EVALUATION OF SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS 
After a highway location is identified as hazardous 
using accident data and(or) conflict data, field 
inspections should be made by an investigative team to 
find specific deficiencies and recommend safety 
improvements. Shortly after completion of the 
improvements, another set of counts should be made 
to determine the effectiveness of the improvement. The 
conflicts afterward will often identify minor 
adjustments, such as signal timing, which might further 
improve the intersection. 
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TABLE I. PRIORITY GROUPS FOR INTERSECTIONS BASED ON 
CONFLICT COUNTS IN WASHINGTON STATE (4) 
PRIORITY GROUP 
NUMBER OF CONFLICTS 
PER HOUR 
SIGNALIZED AND CHANNELIZED, N = 47 
Group I 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Group 4 
Group 5 
SIGNALIZED, N = 36 
Group I 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Group 4 
Group 5 
CHANNELIZED, N = 43 
Group I 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Group 4 
Group 5 
NON-CHANNELIZED, N = 146 
Group I 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Group 4 
Group 5 
ALL INTERSECTIONS, N = 272 
Group I 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Group 4 
Group 5 
39 and over 
28 to 38 
17 to 27 
11 to 16 
10 and under 
65 and over 
46 to 64 
24 to 45 
9 to 23 
8 and under 
38 and over 
29 to 37 
15 to 28 
8 to 14 
7 and under 
39 and over 
26 to 38 
17 to 25 
9 to 16 
8 and under 
40 and over 
27 to 39 
19 to 26 
10 to 18 
9 and under 
Figure 2. Indicator Values for Traffic Conflicts (15). 
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NUMBER OF CONFLICTS PER HOUR 
An analysis of safety improvements at 32 locations 
in Virginia was made in 1971 using before-and-after 
conflict data ( 17) and resulted in a defmite reduction 
of conflicts at 24 of the 32 locations. Highlights from 
that analysis are as follows: 
I. Weave and rear-end conflicts were virtually 
eliminate�at 16 of 17 intersections where 
turn lanes were constructed. 
2. Installation of traffic signals resulted in the 
elimination of cross-traffic conflicts at four 
locations. 
3. Left-turn conflicts were eliminated at one 
intersection after adding a separate left-turn 
phase to the signal. 
4. Prohibition of left-turns from a shopping 
center resulted in elimination of cross-traffic 
conflicts. 
5. A 38-percent reduction in total conflicts and 
the elimination of left-turn conflicts resulted 
at one location after trimming trees to 
improve sight distance. 
6. A 50-percent reduction in total conflicts was 
found after construction of a concrete 
median, but there was some question as to 
the influence of the improvement on the 
conflicts. 
7. At six locations, there were no significant 
changes in conflicts after improvements. 
8. An increase in traffic conflicts occurred after 
improvements at two locationS; the increases 
were attributed to increases in traffic volumes 
during the after period. 
A before and after study of left-turn conflicts was 
made at three intersections in Kentucky, where left-turn 
phasing was installed. At one T-intersection in Louisville 
(Dixie Highway and Deering Road), the number of 
left-turn conflicts decreased by 76 percent; the rate of 
left-turn conflicts (conflicts per I ,000 left-turning 
vehicles) decreased from 104 to 24. At another 
T-intersection in Hopkinsville (US 41A and Skyline 
Drive), there was a 69-percent reduction in left-turn 
conflicts and a decrease in conflict rate from 64 to 20. 
At a four-way intersection in Louisville (Dixie Highway 
and Pages Lane), the number of conflicts per hour 
decreased by 94 percent; and the conflict rate dropped 
from 146 to 8 after installation of left-turn phasing (16). 
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Traffic conflicts were used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of a Green-phase Extension System (GES) 
in another Kentucky study in 1976 (18). GES merely 
extends green time for vehicles detected in an approach 
zone as much as 500 feet (152 m) in advance of 
high-speed intersections. A GES system, when properly 
used, will theoretically reduce the number of rear-end 
and right-angle accidents which occur because of abrupt 
stops and running red lights. The six types of conflicts 
which occur during and shortly after the amber phase 
were counted at two locations. These conflicts were 
reduced by 40 percent at one intersection and 85 
percent at the other. 
In Grand Rapids, Michigan, in 1976 (19), adding 
left-turn phasing, replacing 8-inch (200-mm) lenses with 
12-inch (300-mm) lenses, marking signal heads for each 
lane, and adjusting timing reduced conflicts 11 to 14 
percent for ten major approach legs at five intersections. 
The reduction in accidents was 17 percent. 
A study in Indiana (20) to evaluate the use of stop 
signs, yield signs, and no control at !Slow-volume, rural 
intersections in the ranges of 0 to 25, 26 to SO, and 
51 to 100 vehicles per hour on the minor approaches 
produced conflict probabilities ranging from 0.035 to 
0.137, depending on volume and type of signing. 
Probabilities were higher for stop signs than for yield 
signs or no control. Higher volumes on the minor 
approaches contributed to the higher probability of 
conflict. 
In Virginia and Indiana, new right-turn-on-red 
(RTOR) laws were evaluated using before-and-after 
counts of conflicts (21, 22). In the Virginia study (21), 
counts were made of RTOR conflicts at 20 intersections. 
Specific conflict types counted were 
1. opposing left tum, 
2. through cross-traffic left to right, 
3. left-turn cross-traffic from left, 
4. right-turn cross-traffic, 
5. rear end, and 
6. pedestrian. 
In both studies, the adoption of permissive RTOR was 
found to cause no significant increase in accident 
potential. 
Counts of driver violations and other conflict types 
were made at seven locations in Canada to determine 
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the safety benefits from increased police enforcement 
of traffic laws. Specific violations were categorized as 
improper or prohibited turns, failure to use rrturn" 
indicators, and infractions at the traffic signal. Visible 
presence of police at an urban intersection was found 
to significantly reduce the number of traffic violations. 
However, this effect disappeared almost immediately 
after the police left. No significant change in other 
conflicts was noted (23). 
ACCIDENT-CONFLICT RELATIONSIHPS 
After developing the GM technique, Perkins and 
Harris stated that a high degree of correlation existed 
between conflicts and accidents (7 ). However, a later 
analysis of their published data by Heany (24) in 1969 
found the correlation (r-value) to be about 0.48. The 
conflict counts used in the correlation were not 
classified as to severity. A study by Baker (25) of the 
Federal Highway Administration was completed in 1972 
in cooperation with state highway agencies in Virginia, 
Ohio, and Washington. Conflict data were collected in 
all three states at a total of 886 approach legs at 392 
intersections using the GM technique. Correlation 
coefficients for T- and four-legged intersections were 
computed for accident-conflict situations as shown in 
Table 2. Statistical significance at the five-percent level 
was found for all types of intersections except for 
signalized, T -intersections. Similar correlations were also 
found to be significant for most of the specific conflict 
types for various classes of intersections. The overall 
correlation coefficient (r-value), however, was only 
about 0.46. 
Conflict rates were also determined in the FHW A 
study in terms of conflicts per 1,000 opportunities for 
signalized and non-signalized, four-legged intersections as 
shown in Table 3. Accidents per 100,000 conflicts were 
also found for four conflict types. The data in this study 
were determined to support the theory that conflicts 
and accidents are associated. The conflict technique was 
found to be especially applicable to low-volume, rural 
intersections where the accident reporting level is 
unusually low (25 ). 
TABLE 2. FHWA CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS (r) FOR T AND FOUR-LEGGED 
RIGHT-ANGLE INTERSECTIONS (25) 
LEFT-TURN 
INTERSECTION WEAVE HEAD-ON 
Signalized 
T -0.207 -0.128 
Four-legged right-angle 0.360a 0.66l a 
Allb 0.402a 0.615a 
Non signalized 
T 0.294a 0.432a 
Four-legged right-angle 0.159 0.459a 
Allb 0.276a 0.453a 
All combinedc 0.356a 0.546a 
aindicates statistical significance at the five-percent level. 
blncludes other intersection types such as skewed and multileg 
as well as T and four-legged, right-angle intersections. 
cComposed of all signalized and nonsignalized intersections. 
CONFLICT-ACCIDENT SITUATION 
CROSS· ALL CRITICAl 
TRAFFIC REAR-END MANEUVERS 
-0.170 0.075 -0.172 ± 0.532 
0.209a -0.018 0.410a ± 0.179 
0.136 -0.017 0.326a ± 0.160 
0.830a 0.410a 0.837a ± 0.205 
0.602a 0.213a 0.653a ± 0.192 
0.655a 0.295a 0.67la ± 0.130 
0.429a 0.154a 0.458a ± 0.100 
TABLE 3. FHWA CONFUCT/OPPORTUNITY AND ACCIDENT/CONFUCT RATIOS (25) 
CONFLICT-ACCIDENT SITUATION 
LEFT-TURN CROSS· 
SAMPLE 
SIZE 
14 
122 
157 
94 
106 
235 
392 
INTERSECTION WEAVE HEAD-ON TRAFFIC REAR-END 
Conflicts per 1,000 opportunities 
Signalized, four-legged, right-angle 51 28 15 
Nonsignalized, four-legged, right-angle 64 28 26 
All combineda 65 28 25 
Accidents per 100,000 conflicts 
Signalized. four-legged, right-angle 7 20 56 
Nonsignalized, four-legged, right-angle 7 9 16 
All combineda 6 15 20 
alncludes other intersection types such as skewed, multileg, and T as well as signalized and 
nonsignalized four-legged, right-angle intersections. 
29 
26 
25 
3 
3 
9 
After the FHWA study, which utilized conflict data 
from Ohio, the Ohio DOT expanded their own conflict 
data using the GM technique to include 611 approach 
legs. A series of regression models was generated to 
predict 2-year accident occurrence for signalized 
intersections from the formula which was later expressed 
in the following form (26, 27 ): 
where 
AP2Y 
AP2Y 
= 1.16153 + 11.6345 (ADT) · 
0.0503 (CPT) 0.0321 
(RROPP) + 0.0387 (OCP02) + 
0.0285 (TTOPP) · 0.02255 
(OPOPP) 
= accident prediction value per 2 
years, 
ADT average dally traffic (in ten 
thousands) calculated from 
conflict counts, 
SPLIT = ratio of the sum of the 
OPOPP 
counted cross-street volume to 
the counted approach volume, 
opposing conflict 
opportunities, 
RROPP 
TTOPP 
OPCON = 
CPT = 
rear-end conflict opportunities, 
total observed conflict 
opportunities, 
opposing conflicts, 
total conflicts per 10 
opportunities, 
OCP02 = square of opposing conflicts 
per 10 opportunities, and 
RATE accidents per 2 years per 
10,000 ADT. 
The prediction equation for unsignalized approaches is 
AP2Y = 
= 
0.36 + RATE (ADT) 
0.36 + ADT [22.3568 + 
17.773 ssPLIT) · 36.7045 
(ADT1/ ) . 1.6785 
(SPLIT2) + 18.2544 
(ADT) · 0.0264 (OPOPP) 
+ 0.8385 (OPCON)]. 
Prediction errors using the above equations were 
relatively low, as is shown in Table 4. 
TABLE 4. PREDICTION ERRORS USING EQUATIONS 
DEVELOPED BY OHIO DOT (26) 
PREDICTION ERROR (ACCIDENTS/YEAR) 
DATA CLASS NUMBER OF POINTS 50% 75% 95% 
All Data 
Signalized 
Unsignalized 
611 
220 
391 
The Washington Department of Highways also 
developed its own accident-conflict relationships. Based 
on a study mentioned previously, the average conflicts 
per hour were compared to the average number of 
accidents over a 3-year period for each of the five 
priority groups as shown in Table 5. As conflicts 
increased from less than 9 to over 40 per hour, accidents 
increased from 6.3 to 23.4. Data used for this analysis 
were taken from 240 intersections. An equation was 
developed to predict accidents from conflict data, which 
resulted in an error of 2.6 accidents per year for an 
average of 4 accidents per year. This error is less than 
the error which was found in Kentucky using accident 
data in 1 year to predict accident data the following 
year (3, 4). 
lO 
± 1.2 
± 1.5 
± 1.1 
± 2.0 
± 2.4 
± 1.8 
± 4.2 
± 4.6 
± 3.8 
Coefficients of correlation were also computed in 
Washington state between accidents and conflicts by 
categories of conflicts (Table 6). The strongest 
correlation existed between weave conflicts and 
accidents (r = 0.53). An r-value of 0.42 was found 
between conflicts and accidents for all categories 
combined. The lack of better correlations was attributed 
to the poor year-to-year reliability of accident data in 
Washington (r-values between 0.60 and 0.65) ( 12). 
TABLE 5. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ACCIDENT AND CONFLICT 
LEVELS IN WASHINGTON STATE (12) 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF 
PRIORITY CONFLICTS NUMBER OF UNWEIGHTED ACCIDENTS 
GROUP PER HOUR INTERSECTIONS (3·YEAR TOTAL) 
I 40 and over 39 23.4 
2 27 to 39 38 15.8 
3 19 to 26 34 14.0 
4 10 to 18 55 9.2 
5 9 and under 74 6.3 
TABLE 6. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SPECIFIC TYPES OF CONFLICTS AND 
ACCIDENTS IN WASHINGTON STATE (12) 
CONFLICT TYPE 
Opposing left-turn 
Weave 
Rear-end 
Cross traffic 
All conflicts 
INTERSECTION TYPES 1, 2, 33 INTERSECTION TYPE 4b 
N = 108 N = 132 
.06 .25 
.54 .36 
.38 .43 
.16 .39 
.38 .49 
3Intersection Type I -- Signalized and Channelized 
Intersection Type 2 -- Signalized 
Intersection Type 3 -- Channelized 
blntersection Type 4 -- Non-signalized and Non-channelized 
TOTAL 
N = 240 
.13 
.53 
.39 
.23 
.42 
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The best correlations between accidents and 
conflicts were found in a study by Spicer in Great 
Britain in 1973 (9). Serious conflicts were plotted 
against the number of injury accidents in 3 years as 
shown in Figure 3. The correlation between serious 
conflicts and injury accidents for six intersections was 
0.97, which is statistically significant at the 0.1 -percent 
level. This correlation is extremely high, possibly 
because severe conflicts are more closely related to 
accidents than moderate conflicts (such as brakelight 
applications). Also, using 3-year totals of injury 
accidents, the effects of yearly fluctuations in accidents 
and of non-reporting of minor (non-injury) accidents 
were minimized. 
A study was made in Canada by Hauer in 1975 
concerning accident-conflict relationships. A conclusion 
was that the traffic conflict technique is more accurate 
than accident records in predicting the expected annual 
accident rate at locations with less than three or four 
accidents per year and(or) when the accident history 
is very short. This conclusion was based on estimates 
of variance in accident data at 1,800 intersections and 
variance in traffic conflicts based on the variability of 
the accident-to-conflict ratio (28). 
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Another Canadian study was conducted in 1971 
and 1972 using 59 unsigualized intersections to 
determine what traffic parameters are most efficient for 
predicting accidents. Accidents and conflicts were 
significantly related at the 0.01 level, and the linear 
correlation was 0.45. Conflicts were also found to be 
closely related to traffic volumes. After correlation with 
traffic volume, conflicts could not account fo·r 
differences in numbers of accidents. Summary data from 
that study is given in Table 7, which shows accident 
rates, conflict rates, and conflict-accident ratios for 
various situations (29 ). 
An Australian study in 1976 investigated the 
occurrences of conflicts and accident exposure. A series 
of studies was conducted in the Sydney metropolitan 
area, generally in rush hours, and conflict criteria used 
were similar to the GM technique. Correlations between 
conflicts and volumes at two intersections were 0.54 and 
0.56. It was suggested that conflicts should be classified 
by severity to more accurately estimate accident 
potential. Data were not sufficient for correlating 
conflicts and accidents ( 30 ). 
INTERSErTION I • 
•2 
30 40 50 60 
CONFLICTS IN 10 HOURS 
Figure 3. Number of Injury Accidents and Serions Conflicts at Six Intersections 
in Great Britain (9 ). 
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TABLE 7. ACCIDENT/OPPORTUNITY, CONFLICT/OPPORTUNITY, AND 
CONFLICT/ACCIDENT RATIOS FROM CANADIAN CONFLICT STUDY (29) 
CONFLICT OR ACCIDENTS/MILLION 
ACCIDENT SITUATION OPPORTUNITIES 
Weave 3.50 
Right-turn 0.43 
Cross-traffic 6.32 
Left-turn 
Main legs 1.47 
Minor legs 0.04 
All legs 0.82 
Rear-end 
Main legs 0.20 
Minor legs 1.30 
All legs 0.25 
Total 11.32 
Close correlation between accident types and 
related conflicts has also been found. A study of ' 
left-turn accidents and conflicts at intersections in 
Kentucky in 1976 developed warrants for left-turn 
phasing. Five-year histories of left-turn accidents were 
collected at 32 signalized intersections in Central 
Kentucky and correlated with average left-turn conflicts 
during peak hours. Correlations were found to be as high 
as 0.78 and were greatest ·using the highest 2-year 
accident period at each site ( 16 ). 
In 1975, Thorson and Glennon of Midwest 
Research Institute did an evaluation of the traffic 
conflicts technique (27 ). Most of the major conflict 
studies to date were critically examined. The authors 
were critical of the studies where positive correlations 
were found between conflicts and accidents. The studies 
evaluated by Thorson and Glennon include works by 
Baker (FHW A), Paddock (Ohio), Pugh (Washington), 
Spicer (Great Britain), Cooper (Canada), and Hauer 
(Canada) (25, 26, 4, 9, 29, 28). Examples of criticisms 
made of the studies included insufficient data samples, 
inadequate correlation coefficients, and unsupported 
conclusions. Thorson and Glennon also suggested that 
CONFLICTS/MILLION CONFLICTS/ 
OPPORTUNITIES ACCIDENT 
8,737 2,496 
3,400 7,907 
15,700 2,484 
9,560 6,503 
825 20,625 
5,450 6,646 
1,210 6,050 
4,160 3,200 
1,340 5,360 
34,627 3,059 
accidents and conflicts are related because of their high 
interrelationships with traffic volumes. The assumption 
used in their evaluations is that " . .. accidents are the 
ideal measure of safety for a highway location" (27). 
It follows then that, if conflicts do not correlate highly 
with accident data, something must be inherently wrong 
with conflict data. 
As discussed previously, accidents are considered 
by most experts to be anything but ideal measures of 
safety because of biased and incomplete reporting, 
random accident fluctuations, inconsistant reporting 
criteria for local jurisdictions, and the large accident 
history needed. Several . studies have found that 
correlations between accidents and conflicts depend 
mainly on the reliability of accident reporting. 
Based on the studies available, correlations between 
conflicts and accidents can be quite high, particularly 
if only severe conflicts are compared to accident 
occurrences (9 ). While counts of all conflict types are 
useful to the traffic engineer, severe conflicts appear to 
more closely indicate accident probability. Some form 
of severity weighting formula for conflicts should be 
evaluted. 
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Studies by Cooper and Paddock have shown that 
conflict counts using the GM technique are highly 
related to traffic volumes. However, correlations 
between severe conflicts and traffic volumes were found 
to be quite low. Spicer found the correlation between 
severe conflicts and traffic volumes to be 0.26, and the 
correlation between volum�and severe accidents was 
0.15. However, accident-conflict correlations of the 
same sample were 0.97 (9 ). Russam and Sabey found 
correlations between accident severity and volume and 
conflict severity and volume to be 0.10 and 0.08, 
respectively. Accidents and severe conflicts were found 
to be closely related ( 31). 
Current thinking among many experts is that 
fmding high correlations between accidents and conflicts 
is not important. Since conflict data provide information 
about current conditions at a site, it is extremely 
informative, particularly at sites having low volumes or 
insufficient accident histories. However, the use of both 
accident and conflict data whenever possible provides 
the best data base for identifying and evaluating 
hazardous sites. 
CONFLICTS ON FREEWAY RAMI'S 
The application of the traffic conflict technique to 
freeway ramps was recently developed by Bart Cima of 
the Illinois Department of Transportation ( 32). Eleven 
specific driver maneuvers were defmed as conflicts at 
entrance ramps onto freeways. These conflicts have been 
classified as acceleration-lane or merge-lane conflicts. 
Accelerationalane conflicts occur on the entrance ramp 
forward of the first opportunity for merger. Merge-lane 
conflicts occur on the mainline lane adjacent to the 
entrance. Conflicts were also classified as routine, 
moderate, or severe. The six acceleration�lane conflicts 
are as follows: 
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I. A braking-on-the-accleration-lane-or-ramp 
conflict occurs when a merging vehicle is 
braked because no acceptable gap appears in 
the freeway traffic stream. A brakelight 
indication is considered a routine conflict; a 
vehicle forced to stop would be either a 
moderate or severe conflict, depending on the 
deceleration rate (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Braking-on-Ramp Conflict (32). 
2. A brake-for-lead-vehicle conflict occurs when 
the lead vehicle in a platoon of vehicles 
entering the freeway causes one or more of 
the following vehicles to brake or stop (Figure 
5). Severity Is assigned based on whether a 
brakelight indication or vehicle stopping 
results. 
Figure S. Brake-for-Lead-Vehicle Conflict (32). 
3. A weavmg-around-the-lead-vehicle conflict 
occurs when a following vehicle weaves 
around the lead vehicle and enters the 
mainstream of the freeway (Figure 6). The 
effect of the weaving vehicle on the lead 
vehicle determines the conflict severity. 
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Figure 6. Weaving-around-Lead-Vehicle 
Conflict (32). 
(1 
4. A lane-two-entrance conflict is where an 
entering vehicle enters the freeway and 
immediately crosses into an inner lane of the 
freeway. The conflict severity is determined 
by its smoothness and the speed and angle of 
entry (Figure 7). 
Figure 7. Lane-Two-Entrance Conflict (32). 
5.  A double-entry conflict occurs when two 
vehicles in the acceleration lane are competing 
for gaps and(or) merging opportunities. The 
mutual danger created by the vehicles 
determines severity (Figure 8). 
Figure 8. Double-Entry Conflict (32). 
6. A late-entry conflict occurs when a vehicle 
waits until reaching the end of the 
acceleration lane before merging and 
encroaches the shoulder (Figure 9). Severity 
is determined by the driver's control during 
the maneuver and the nearness of collision 
with other freeway vehicles. 
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Figure 9. Late-Entry Conflict ( 32 ). 
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The five traffic conflicts related to the merge lane are 
as follows: 
1 .  A weave conflict occurs when an entering 
vehicle causes a mainline vehicle to change 
lanes, as shown in Figure 10. The severity is 
determined based on the smoothness of the 
weave and the danger of collision. 
_L_ _ _ _ _ _ _  r \[1J----�cc_-::=: __ =--'�<- [DJ <) -----------�--------------------...--- <) 
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Figure 10. Weave Conflict ( 32 ). 
2. A rear-end cont1ict occurs when an entering 
vehicle causes a mainline vehicle to brake 
(Figure I I). Severity is based on the degree 
of deceleration by the mainline vehicle and 
the closeness of a collision. 
_,n � -----------------cl\::1'"�-·;:;.;fu:.:::_--:----:=r �(1:-
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<) 
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<) 
Figure II. Rear-End Cont1ict ( 32 ). 
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3 .  A secondary-weave cont1ict arises when a 
mainline vehicle slows for an entering vehicle 
and causes a following, mainline vehicle to 
change lanes. The lead vehicle need not be 
involved in a rear-end conflict, but an entering 
vehicle is required (Figure 12). Severity is 
determined by smoothness of the lane change 
and the closeness of the two mainline vehicles. 
Figure 12. Secondsry-Weave Cont1ict (32) . 
4. A secondary-rear-end cont1ict occurs when a 
mainline vehicle slows down for an entering 
vehicle and causes a following, mainline 
vehicle to brake. Severity is determined by the 
degree of deceleration of the following vehicle 
and the danger of collision between the two 
mainline vehicles (Figure 13). 
Figure 13. Secondary-Rear-End Cont1ict (32). 
5. An encroachment conllict occurs when a 
mainline vehicle crosses the line of the inner 
lane to avoid an entering vehicle. The 
offended vehicle does not change lanes in this 
case, as shown in Figure 14. The degree of 
swerving detennines the severity. 
Figure 14. Encroachment Conflict (32). 
Background data are required for each location 
under study. Required geometric data for the freeway 
includes number of lanes, pavement type, shoulder 
width and surface type, aligrunent, and grade. Ramp 
data includes ramp type, length of acceleration lane, 
ramp width at nose, merging angle, grade, and ramp 
controls (if any). A minimum of 2 years of accident 
data is desirable. Traffic volumes classified as cars or 
commercial vehicles are also needed for each freeway 
lane and the entrance ramp. Weather conditions and 
lighting are also recorded as they vary during the survey 
day. 
Observers should classify conflicts at the site or 
from video recordings. A minimum of 4 to 6 hours of 
training is required for each observer. Observers should 
position themselves about 200 feet (60 m) upstream 
from the ramp junction. Conflicts should be classified 
as to type and severity using Figures 15  and 16. Data 
are recorded in 5-minute intervals. Designations should 
be made by defming the type(s) of vehicles involved 
in each conflict situation. Starting times and duration 
of counts depend upon the objectives of the study. The 
number of survey days needed depends on the amount 
of data collected at a site. Usually a minimum of two 
observers is required at a time to collect volume and 
conflict data. 
ERRATIC MANEUVERS 
An erratic maneuver is any movement that involves 
a sudden disruption of direction and( or) the speed. An 
erratic maneuver is usually equivalent to a moderate or· 
severe conflict. The term "erratic maneuver" differs 
from a conflict in that an erratic maneuver usually 
involves only one vehicle which commits an unsafe 
movement independently of other vehicles. An erratic 
maneuver may result in a conflict if another vehicle is 
forced to brake or weave. Poor signing and inadequate 
geometric design often cause erratic maneuvers. While 
traffic conflict counts usually indicate the potential for 
accidents between two or more vehicles, erratic 
maneuver counts provide information about the 
potential for single-vehicle accidents. Erratic maneuver 
counts can be used in much the same way as conflict 
counts. 
One of the primary uses of erratic movement 
counts to date has been for evaluating problems at gore 
areas and lane drops on interstates and freeways. In a 
study in 1973 to determine causes of erratic maneuvers 
at exit gores, Taylor and McGee ( 33) defmed eight types 
of erratic maneuvers as follows: 
I. Cross-gore-paint occurs when a vehicle crosses 
the lane-delineation line in the gore area while 
exiting or continuing through. 
2. Cross-gore-area is where a vehicle traverses the 
unpaved area beyond the pavement markings 
while exiting or continuing through. 
3. Stop-in-gore occurs when a vehicle comes to 
a complete stop in any part of the gore area 
before exiting or continuing through. 
4. Back-up is where a vehicle passes the gore 
area, stops, and backs to change direction. 
5 .  Sudden-slowing occurs when a vehicle follows 
the proper path but brakes abruptly. 
6. A lane-change, in this instance, is a delayed 
weave into the outer lane; the vehicle traverses 
one or more lanes within the deceleration lane 
area in order to exit. 
7. A swerve is where a vehicle changes lateral 
position suddenly within the deceleration lane 
area while exiting or continuing through. 
8. Stop-on-shoulder occurs when a vehicle stops 
on the shoulder within the interchange area 
and then continues through or exits. 
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A vehicle was not counted if it was forced into an erratic 
maneuver by another vehicle. If a trailing vehicle 
corrunitted a similar erratic maneuver as the lead vehicle, 
such as a sudden slowing, only one erratic maneuver 
was counted. Also, if a vehicle stopped in the vicinity 
of the exit for an obvious, unrelated purpose (such as 
to change drivers or for vehicle repairs), no erratic 
maneuver was assigned. 
The counting day consisted of observations during 
14 hours of daylight and 4 hours of darkness at each 
of the nine exit sites. The sites incorporated various 
geometric features. Erratic maneuver rates were found 
in terms of exiting and through traffic. The factors 
found to cause erratic maneuvers at freeway exits were 
classified as driver related (a breakdown in the driver's 
decision�rnaking process), information deficiencies, or 
geometric deficiencies. Remedial improvements were 
made at eight of the nine sites and evaluated using driver 
interviews and counts of erratic maneuvers. The 
frequency of hazardous vehicle maneuvers was reduced 
due to the of improvement of signing and delineation. 
A 1972 study was conducted in Kentucky to 
determine traffic behavior at seven lane-drop locations 
as influenced by various types of signs, pavement 
markings, and lane delineations (34). Erratic movements, 
brakelight applications, vehicle speeds, and lane volumes 
were counted at each site. The types of erratic 
movements counted were cut-across-gore-area, 
crowded-weave, stopped, stopped and backed, 
slowed-drastically, swerved, and multiple error. Data for 
the Kentucky study were initially collected during a 
12-hour duration: 9 hours in daytime and 3 hours at 
night. Observations were scheduled to correspond to 
high-volume times. Due to no correlations between 
traffic volumes and erratic maneuver rates, samples were 
later limited to six daytime hours having high volumes 
of traffic. Three checks of observer reliability showed 
no significant differences between observers. 
At the seven lane drops, three configurations of 
devices were tested. These included various 
combinations of yellow striping, pavement reflectors, 
and modifications of exit signing. Different traffic 
control devices were found to be more effective in 
reducing erratic excursions, depending on geometric 
differences. No significant reductions in brakelight rates 
were attributable to the improvements. 
A study utilizing counts of erratic maneuvers was 
completed in 1972, and its objective was to determine 
the most effective traffic controls for maintenance on 
high-speed highways (35 ). Various types of signing were 
used at lane closures on interstate facilities. Data 
collection included spot speeds, erratic maneuvers 
(termed "traffic conilicts" in the report), merging 
maneuvers, and tum-signal indications. Erratic 
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maneuvers counted were abiwrrnal brake application, 
forced merge, and complete stop. The locations of 
merging maneuvers with respect to the lane closures 
were also recorded and expressed as percentages within 
various distances from the lane closure. Driver interviews 
were also conducted with respect to the maintenance 
signing. Orange signs were found to be slightly better 
than yellow signs in reducing erratic maneuvers and 
merges near the barricade. Significant improvements 
were also noted using newer, clearer signing. Driver 
attitudes about lane-closure signs were found to have 
compounded the problem of effective signing. 
Another Kentucky study utilizing erratic 
maneuvers was completed in 1974 by Pigman and Agent, 
and its purpose was to test the effectiveness of various 
types of raised, pavement markers for traffic control at 
lane drops (36). Counts of erratic movements, brakelight 
applications, and lane volumes were taken at five 
lane-drop locations. Data were recorded for six daylight 
hours and three nighttime hours at each site. Erratic 
movements were grouped as cut�across-gore-area, 
crowded-weave, stopped, slowed-drastically, swerved, 
stopped-and-backed, and multiple-error. After 
installation of raised, pavement markers, a statistically 
significant decrease in the total erratic movement rate 
occurred in nearly all cases, particularly at night. The 
total reduction in erratic movement rate was 27 percent. 
No significant change in brakelight rates was noted. The 
installation of raised, pavement markers at other 
lane-drop locations was recommended based on their 
cost effectiveness. 
A study was made of traffic maneuvers at the 
interchange of I 81 and Route 33 near Harrisonburg. 
Virginia, by Parker in 1976 to determine if remedial 
measures, including construction of acceleration lanes, 
were warranted (37). Specifically, the maneuvers 
counted were weaves, near-or�full-stop-on-shoulder, 
near-or-full-stop-on-ramp, right-turn-cross-traffic, and 
rear-end conilicts (brakelight applications). Volume 
counts, color photographs, and super-8 movies were 
taken. Observation periods consisted of eleven 
IS-minute counts at each ramp during the morning and 
evening peak-traffic periods. It was concluded that the 
high occurrence of adverse maneuvers and conflicts 
could be reduced or eliminated by constructing 
acceleration lanes at the ramps. 
A study of erratic maneuvers was made at the 
interchange of I 10 and I 1 ! 0  near Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana, to determine the need to replace conventional 
signing with a diagranunatic sign. Problems were believed 
to be occurring with motorists westbound on I 10, 
which must keep to the left and take what appears to 
be a left exit to remain on I I 0. Measures selected to 
determine sign effectiveness were abnmmal weaves, 
stopping and( or) backing, and other unusual maneuvers 
such as hesitations, partial weaves, or abnormal braking. 
The original intent was to compare erratic movements 
under conventional signing with counts after installation 
of the diagranunatic sign. However, because of the 
relatively low incidence of these erratic maneuvers, the 
use of diagranunatic signing was not warranted. Thus, 
no signing changes were made at the site (38). 
Diagranunatic signing was evaluated using erratic 
maneuvers at an exit to the Capitol Beltway near 
Washington, D.C., in a 1971 study by Hanscom (39). 
A significant decrease in weaving maneuvers in the gore 
area was found after installation of the diagranunatic 
sign. Also, fewer vehicles stopped and backed during the 
after period. However, an increase in partial weaves and 
vehicle hesitations was attributed to more tourists during 
the after period. Overall, a safer condition resulted from 
use of the diagrammatic sign, and statistical tests showed 
more consistent patterns of driver behavior. A 
considerable reduction in accident rate also resulted 
during the after period. 
The evaluation of a color delineation and marking 
scheme for highway interchanges was made in a 1967 
study in Michigan (40). Data included erratic 
movements, driver interviews, and accident data at the 
interchanges in the northbound direction of a 40-mile 
(64-km) section of US 23 between Ann Arbor and Flint, 
Michigan. Conclusive evidence was not found, but there 
was a significant reduction in erratic movements and 
accident experience at locations where the marking 
scheme was used. 
Counts of vehicle encroachments on a 40-foot 
(12-m) median of I 74 in Illinois were used by 
Hutchinson to determine minimum, desirable median 
widths (41). Encroachments into the median were noted 
from direct observation, police accident records, and 
repair records of barrier medians. Encroachment rates 
were detennined for various volume ranges. A minimum, 
clear median of 30 feet (9 m) was recommended with 
mild cross slopes for safe stopping or control of 
encroaching vehicles at rural highway speeds. A 30-foot 
(9-m) clear zone on the right of the road was also 
recommended. 
In a 1974 study by Vaswani in Virginia (42), 
wrong-way entries at interchanges on four-lane, divided 
highways were evaluated in a 2-year survey. Incidences 
of wrong-way driving were used along with accident 
reports which involved wrong-way vehicles. Several sites 
were identified as having high occurrences of wrong-way 
incidents and accidents, and on�site investigations were 
made at five sites. Case studies were made of those sites 
and specific recommendations were made fo; 
improvements. 
Little, if any, information is available concerning 
types and numbers of erratic maneuvers which occur 
at intersections; this is so because accident analyses and 
conflict data have primarily been used. When observing 
operational problems at an intersection, various types 
of erratic maneuvers may occur, depending on the 
geometric and traffic conditions of the intersection. 
Some of the erratic maneuvers recurring with some 
regularity may include 
1 .  Uaturn, 
2. use of the shoulder for turns (short turn lane), 
3. right-turners hitting curb (inadequate room 
4. 
5. 
for right turn), 
vehicles overrunning stop 
vehicles backing from 
intersection, and 
bar and backing, 
driveways near 
6. weaves into turn lanes and then back into 
major stream of traffic. 
NEAR-MISS ACCIDENTS 
A nearamiss accident occurs when a collision is 
avoided due to a last-second movement or stop by one 
or more vehicles. A nearamiss accident is a very severe 
type of conflict or erratic maneuver, and relatively few 
near-miss accidents may normally be observed at any 
location as compared to conflicts or erratic maneuvers. 
One of the problems with using near·miss accidents 
for safety monitoring or accident prediction is the great 
dependence on judgment by the observers. A 
conservative observer may consider an event as 
dangerous; it may appear to be commonplace to an 
observer who dtives aggressively. Therefore, counts of 
near-miss accidents will vary substantially depending on 
the personalities, driving experiences, and state-of-mind 
of the observers. 
One of the first studies of near-miss accidents was 
by Forbes in 1957 (43). A total of 179 near-accident 
reports were filed by people interested or working with 
traffic. Information in greater detail was expected as 
compared to accident information since no liability 
would be involved with a near·accident. Questions 
concerned accident description, causative factors, 
environmental conditions, and state-of-mind of the 
drivers. In most nearaaccidents, from two to seven causal 
factors were involved. "DriversDinaaahurry" was an 
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important factor. Only limited success was founa using 
such questionnaire data for engineering purposes. More 
research was suggested to determine the various 
combinations of behavior and conditions which may get 
drivers into accident situations. 
To reduce the subjectivity of defmiug a near-miss 
accident, a frame of reference was developed for 
distinguishing degree of danger of traffic events. A 
parameter termed time-measured-to-collision or 
time-to-accident (TA) was developed by Hayward in 
1972 (44). The TA is the time required for two vehicles 
to collide if they continue at their present speeds and 
on the same path. Calculation of the TA may be 
performed at any instant within the excursion. A high 
TA represents a small amount of danger since ample 
time is available to react and avoid a collision. A low 
TA indicates that extreme evasive reaction is necessary 
to avoid a collision. 
Events of near-misses were filmed in the Hayward 
study using two television cameras positioned on 
opposite corners of the intersection of 14th and F 
Streets in Washington, D.C. Continuous monitoring was 
used, and near�miss accidents were transferred onto 
16-rnm motion picture film for further analysis. 
Observation periods were from 9:30 a.m. to 1 :00 p.m. 
and 2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. on two test days; a total 
of 90 suspected near-misses were recorded, and 43 were 
later analyzed. The parameters determined for each 
vehicle for every point in the near-miss sequence were 
velocity, acceleration, coordinate positions, spacing, and 
time-to-accident. 
A numerical rnmunum tin1e-to-accident was 
considered to be approximately I /2 second, which 
corresponds to the time required for one driver to apply 
his brakes. Minimum TA' s were found to be as low as 
0.20 seconds for the near-misses, and 15 of 43 events 
had TA' s at or below I second. The average of the TA 
minimums was 1 .46 seconds and the median TA value 
was 1.25 seconds. The near-miss types were classified 
in one of the following categories: 
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I .  Rear-end occurs when a following vehicle is 
forced to stop suddenly to avoid an accident. 
2. Lane-change, in this instance, is where a slow 
vehicle changes lanes into the path of a faster 
vehicle, causing it to either slow or swerve to 
avoid a collision. 
3. Cutoff occurs wheu a vehicle tllrllS iu front 
of another vehicle, causing it to alter its 
motion. 
4. Broadside is when a vehicle passes into the 
intersection on the an1ber phase and blocks 
the cross street. 
5 .  Right-of-way occurs when two drivers proceed 
to the same point and refuse to grant a clear 
path to the other. 
The suggested criterion for designating a near-miss 
accident was I second. At the test intersection, the 
number of near-miss accidents meeting this criteria per 
hour was 3.5, which corresponded closely with the 
number of accidents per year, which was 4. Near-misses 
were determined to be valid indicators of the danger 
of two-vehicle interactions. Recommendations were 
made for establishing an ongoing program to routinely 
count near�miss accidents. 
Another study using the concept of 
time-to-accident to determine the seriousness of traffic 
events was by Hyden in Sweden in 1975 (45). There, 
events were defmed as conflicts and serious conflicts, 
and a serious conflict corresponded: to defmitions by 
others of a near-miss accident. Serious conflicts were 
graded by two criteria: T A less than I second, and T A 
between I and 1.5 seconds. Attempts were also made 
to classify conflicts for the two T A criteria by speeds 
below 22 mph (34 km/hr) or above 22 mph (35 km/hr). 
In the Hyden study, data were recorded by trained 
observers at 50 intersections. Observations were made 
between 9:00 a.m. and 6:30 p.m. with one or two 
observers at each site. Intersections were classified by 
signal control, traffic speed, and sight conditions. 
Because of the poor reporting of non-injury accidents 
(estimated at 25 to 50 percent), only injury accidents 
were used for comparisons with conflicts. All accidents 
and conflicts were classified by means of transport 
(car-pedestrian, car-car, car-bicycle, etc.), time of day, 
and vehicle movement (straight or turning). A total of 
247 accidents and 765 conflicts were analyzed. 
Correlations were made between accident data (injury 
accidents only) and severe conflicts (near-miss accidents) 
for the 50 intersections in Sweden. Using regression 
analyses, r values were quite low. However, after 
redefming the variables with respect to speed and means 
of transport, r-values of around 0.73 were found. The 
major problem with correlating accidents and near-miss 
accidents was the inadequacy of the available accident 
data. 
ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS 
Since the number of conflicts at a site is related 
to traffic volumes, the use of conflict rates may be more 
desirable for analysis purposes. However, a large sample 
of conflict data is necessary to determine what conflict 
rates are unusually high for various types of locations. 
Thus, the use of conflict and accident data together may 
be most beneficial for identifying hazardous locations. 
Careful training of observers is also essential for accurate 
counts of traffic conflicts. 
As mentioned previously, there are several 
advantages to using conflict, erratic maneuver, and 
near-miss accident data in traffic engineering studies. 
These data provide up-to-date information in as little 
as one day of observation. The techniques allow 
determination of specific traffic problems which may 
not be discernible from accident data. Some studies have 
shown conflict counts to be better predictors of future 
accidents than past accident records, particularly at 
low-volume and rural intersections. 'The most promising 
uses of conflict data appear to be in identifying specific 
geometric deficiencies at a site and for evaluating safety 
improvements shortly after they are installed. When used 
along with accident data, counts of conflicts, erratic 
maneuvers, and near�miss accidents provide a better 
understanding of safety needs so that money for safety 
improvements can be expended in a more cost�effective 
manner. 
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STOP SIGN 
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t OUTLYING BUS. OIST 
� 
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� (Ch•ckOne) 
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12-J 
MULTILEG + '  1--1--ROTARY -9- "  1--OTHER 3 '= 
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!lli!!M! � NO�E 1 1--
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,
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MOUNTABLE CURB(>2') 5f---
BARRIE!>.(> It' HIGH) £ f---
OTHER J� 
_!j (ChetkOrH!) LEFT-TURN THR!J '"""'"""" � PAINT STRIPED I MOUNTABLE 1 BARRIER 3 
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� 
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""' -
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2 fi'3T4 
3 )5:7£ 
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5 19-!10 
"' 
m• 
TURN 
---
REGULATORY WARNING GUIDE 
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RIGHT 
TURN 
TURN DEST[ii. 
NO �""� STOP SIGNAL JUNCTION OR ATION 
TURNS CONTROL · OTHER �HEAD AHEAD OTHER ASSEMBLY• DIREC· AND/OR OTHER ARROWS . TIONAL MILEAGE 
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5 9':+ ,1j ,1j � ,1j � � � t;  ,1j 1:a 8 1- � f:a ;5 f:a ;5 f:a 1j5 EB ;5 EB ;5 ;5 E � � I  g ; � m � �  � � �  � � � �  1 � � � ;  m � ; g �  ! ��  1 � �  1 � �  � � � ! � ; � �  C---
II 
I ;  I �hd I n� �� � � " . .  , � � �  . .  · · · · · � " I · ;; 8 � � � $ 8 0:.: ..: � ;:: � .::' .35 � 6 
I I �  
" 1 " 1 1  , . , i:; � 8 
" 
� n I � ,  
� �  * f"""1 OR  
+ �� 
-+ I "" ,_,,� L I 
Traffic Conflicts Data Sheet "An 
Counter's Inventory of 
Existing Highway Features 
DiStrict =�· �Co�<m�ty�
�;;;==�
L===_l� 
Major 'Route 
Mfnor Route 
Route Desig. _ _ _  -• Log Point _ _  . _ _  
Recorded By 
"""""' 
Figure A3. Data Sheet for Inventory of Existing Highway features from GM Techniqne (8). 
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PROJ. NO 
IFill In\ 
INTERSECTION 
�PPROACH NO 
cEb 
� B 
[Follin) 
� 
COMPLETION O�TE 
� � �  
ffjllln\ 
COST OF 
IMPROVEMENT 
M I I I I I I I 
*INCLUDES APPROACHES TO THE RIGHT 
PLUS THE COUNTED APPROACH 
� 
SIGNS 
1 ll-15 
!J1lli. 2 26-:ll 
{Check Up 3 31-35 
To fjve 4 36-40 
Per Lane) 5 4H5 
APPROACHES l 46-50 
IQ.l!!f. 1 51-55 
RIGHT J 50-<;0 
(CIIeck Up To 6J.65 
Fnre Per 5 66-70 
Approach) 6 11-75 
� 
SIGNALS 
LANES 
' 9·11 
' 13-16 
(Cnec� u� 3 17·1D 
To Four 4 11·14 Pe1 LO!!e) 5 25·28 
APPRO�.CHES l 29·31 
TO THE 2 33·36 
RI�HT 3 lHO 
(Check Up To 4 41-44 
Four Per 5 4'HS 
App!oaoh) 6 40-51 
� 
GENERAL 
' 9·13 
APPROACHES' 2 14·18 
(Check Up To 3 19·21 
Fi11e Per 4 14·18 
Appro•d') 5 29·33 
6 34·38 
REGULATORY 
"" "' "' em RIGHT TURNS TURN TURN 
� � , " 5 � §  ffi � � 0 " > � :r: �  2:; if 1; if 
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• • � � 
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• � � '; .g  
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" 
�� " •  
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� �  
� g;:  
' 
WARNING 
noe SIGNAL JUNCTION 
AHEAD AHEAD OTHER ASSEMBLY" 
� �  
, � B � B � B 
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Figure A4. Data Sheet for Inventory of Intersection Improvements from GM Teclmique (8). 
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ASSEMBLY 
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� � �  
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AND/OR 
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• 
OTHER 
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1 53·54 
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Traffic COnflicts Data Sheet •g• 
Analyst's Invelltory of 
Intersection Improvements 
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Major 'Route 
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Route Desig. - - - -• tog Point _ _  • _ _  
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Cdumn 26 · ACCIDENT TYPE C""" I Column 31 · DAY OF WEEI( Code I Column 42. SEVERITY ,_ 
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DATE " 
ACCIDENT 
�1--l I < o  . " " lJ.. :<: 0:: CC ..J � � � � g   > 
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Sl.,..;ng <>< Stoppad kl• Right Tum 
Slowi"!! o• Stoppod (No Tu•nol 
Othor R""' End 
e. Sicloowipe 
laftfi CIIango 
OthorSidusw;p., 
C. 0pp<ISito Di....,ion 
Loft-Tum 
Othor OP!>'>'ito Di""'ti<>n 
: 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 _ _  
D. Cr<m·T,.ffio 
Str.,;ght·Tbru 
Loft-Tum 
Rigln-Tum 
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D 
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12:00 Midnight 
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YES J t3 (FIIIIn) PERIOD STUDY PERIOD NO 2 FROM 
MONTH DAY YEAR 
(Fill ln) __§__ __B._ _B_ INTERSECTION Q] [I] [JJ [I] 
APPROACH NO 0 TO --
MONTH DAY YEAR � cn teJ  
Figure AS. Accident Data Sheet from GM Technique ( 8 ). 
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W..dnM<Iay 
ThufOd:ry 
F•id.ay 
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Nonfotol lnjuoy 
Prope•tv·Dom- Only 
Columni,43-47 . PROP�RTY DAMAGE ($) 
Column 32-37 · DATE OF ACCIDENT 
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Column 48. WEATHER AND PAVEMENT CONDITION 
Cleor/Cioudy 0.V 
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CI-/Cioudy le�t/Snow 
Rain-W..t 
flam-lar/Sn""' 
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Snow-leo/Snooo­
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F09-lco/Snow 
Column 49. LIGHT CONDITION 
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Traffic Conflicts Data Sheet •£• 
Accident Data 
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Recorded By -�------------­
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ATTACH PHOTOGRAPHS HERE 
Figure A6. Photograph Sheet from GM Technique (8). 
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